

17 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
VC/CIPC

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SUBJECT: Results of Meeting of the Force Multiplier Group, 10 June 1986

1. Status of Group's Work. As of the end of the subject meeting--the third, mostly devoted to "educational" subjects (see attachment)--here is where things stand:

- An "installment" approach is desirable v.s. covering all three of the TOR's categories of military activities where the force multiplier concept applies.
- The TOR do not need amending, but a methodology is needed for the category to be selected.

2. Next Steps. After meeting with Miller (ASD C3I) [REDACTED] (CIA), and [REDACTED] (DIA), my sense is that "theater warfighting" is the category about which we would make our most valuable contribution (this category also matches one of "the greatest problem areas" identified in the National Intelligence Strategy). I intend to formally propose this for the group at its next meeting (tomorrow). We also will review DIA's methodological approach in conjunction with my own. At that point we will have largely completed the "review and develop" the phase of our work that Eloise asked of the CIPC in her 24 April memorandum. I plan concurrently to request agency contributions and ask Eloise to approve the TOR.

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DCI/ICS/CIPC (17 Jun 86)

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(Meeting of 10 June 1986)

ASD/C3I (A. Miller). The hard part is quantifying, or measuring, what the force multiplier actually is--putting numbers on the variables is a very complex task. What about the time factor? Commanders can make their decisions in three seconds or ten minutes--which is more important? There are about 1,000 different line items in the NFIP--what are the "drivers" that should be used for each of them? Doing the study in installments is okay, but an overall methodology is needed with a focus on one or two NFIP programs, although this still will be difficult. How, for example, does one aggregate SIGINT programs?

CIPC Staff [] Nobody knows how to assign values to the variables in models for demonstrating that intelligence is a force multiplier, but there are ways of "reasoning through." If intelligence is "bad," how does one know this? In any case, the explicit treatment of some 1,000 NFIP line items is a "pipedream." [In his presentation to the group, [] demonstrated that intelligence can change the course of the outcome of a battle the same way that more military strength can.]

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CIA [] It is very hard to evaluate the human factor--what values are assigned to this? The Israelis always do well in battle. What accounts for this in terms of training, experience, etc.? In any case, an installment approach for this study seems reasonable.

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DCA (J. Pasquiarello). A broad methodological approach is needed--it may be impossible to develop an "analytical anecdotal." For its own part, the DCA has an ongoing project, "Global Assessment," that it is doing for the JCS with DIA analytical and technical support. The assessment began two years ago and covers all of DoD's C³I programs en route to developing "optimal investment strategies" for their packaging. The assessment is very broad and mission-oriented (an example of the latter is "air superiority".) It starts with strategic objectives and relies upon "rigorous" models. While it applies only to C³ issues, it might be adaptable to "I" or NFIP issues.

Army (J. Tullbane). The installment or incremental approach for the study makes sense. Specific NFIP line items should not be addressed. A general context is needed within which a sequential approach is taken starting, perhaps, with warfighting since it is easiest to determine advantages and disadvantages for this.

Air Force (R. O'Neil). It would be easier to grapple with peacetime v.s. warfighting. But whatever category is selected, it should involve the application of all of the "ints."

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DIA [] An installment approach might be advisable, but that leads to some confusion about the status of the TOR now in hand.

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Meeting Notes: [] PBS, briefed the group on an overview of the NFIP, and [] briefed on the force multiplier concept. The NSA representative called just before the meeting to say that he had wrongly recorded the meeting date and therefore could not be present because of transportation difficulties. DCA will brief its "global assessment" project at the next meeting of the group scheduled for Wednesday, 18 June 1986. I asked the representatives to develop their thinking about study methodology.

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